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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JERRY PERFECTO SISNEROS, JR. 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 990599-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from the denial of his untimely motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
to forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999). This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Should this Court overrule its prior decisions that an untimely motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea is jurisdictionally barred when defendant did not raise this issue below 
and when this Court recently rejected the same argument in a published decision? 
Standard of Review: Issues raised for the first time on appeal are reviewed for plain 
error. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997); State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 
(Utah), cert, denied by 493 U.S. 814,110 S.Ct. 62 (1989). However, an appellate court will 
ordinarily decline to review an issue first raised on appeal if the appellant has not argued in 
his brief that plain error or any exceptional circumstances justify review of the claim. See 
State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (declining to review issue not raised 
below when appellant did not argue "that 'exceptional circumstances' or 'plain error' 
justifies a review of the issue"). 
Issue No. 2: Did the trial court commit plain error in accepting defendant's plea when 
the trial court's careful plea colloquy in conjunction with defendant's properly incorporated 
plea affidavit strictly complied with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure? 
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court has strictly complied with rule 11 in 
taking a guilty plea presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See State v. Smith, 
812 P.2d 470,476 (Utah App. 1991) (a trial court's failure to strictly comply with rule 11 in 
accepting a plea constitutes good cause, as a matter of law, for withdrawing that plea). 
Issue No. 3: Does this Court have jurisdiction to consider defendant's claim that his 
counsel was ineffective for not filing a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea? If so, has 
defendant shown that counsel's alleged deficiency prejudiced him when he has not shown 
that good cause existed for him to withdraw his plea? 
Standard of Review: Whether appellate jurisdiction exists is a question of law. 
Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, f 16, 982 P.2d 572. An ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim raised for the first time on appeal presents a question of law. State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 
2 
801, 806 (Utah App.), cert, denied by 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1998); State v. Callahan, 866 P.2d 
590, 593 (Utah App. 1995). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The text of the following controlling statutes and rules is attached in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1999); 
Utah R. Crim. Proc. 11. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
An information, dated January 22, 1999, charged defendant with two counts of 
forgery, third degree felonies, and one count of theft by deception, a class B misdemeanor 
(R. 9-10). The charges stemmed from defendant's forging and cashing two stolen checks 
totaling $200.00 (R. 9-10). 
On April 1, 1999, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of forgery in exchange for 
the State dismissing the other two charges (R. 20, 26-27, 29; R. 78, Plea Hearing at 2, 7). 
Before taking the plea, the trial court engaged defendant in a colloquy as required by rule 11, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (R. 78, Plea Hearing at 3-5). (A complete copy of the plea 
transcript is reproduced in Addendum B). The court first advised defendant that by pleading 
guilty, he would be admitting that he committed the crime of forgery and that he would be 
waiving his rights to the presumption of innocence, to the privilege against self-
incrimination, and to confront and cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses (Add. B, at 3-
4). The court further explained that the guilty plea would expose defendant to a potential 
penalty of five years in prison and that even if given probation, defendant could serve up to 
3 
one year in jail {id. at 4-5). The court also informed defendant that he could be subjected to 
fines and a restitution order {id. at 5). Defendant stated that he understood these rights and 
he had no questions concerning them {id. at 3-5). 
Before entering his plea, defendant also executed in open court a "Statement of 
Defendant," or plea affidavit, affirming that he understood his rights and that he was waiving 
them by pleading guilty (R. 20-27; Add. B at 3, 6). (The plea affidavit is reproduced in , 
Addendum C). Defendant assured the trial court that he had "carefully reviewed" the plear 
affidavit with his attorney and that he understood "all of the rights that [were] set forth in that 
document" (Add. B at 3-4). 
As required by rule 11(e)(3), the plea affidavit stated that defendant knew and 
understood that by pleading guilty, he was giving up his right to the presumption of 
innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy trial before 
an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examination the prosecution's witnesses, 
and the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses at state expense (Add. C at 22-
23). 
The affidavit also stated that defendant had read the information and understood the 
nature and elements of forgery (Add. C at 21). The elements of forgery were then 
handwritten on the affidavit (Add. C at 21). In the subsequent paragraph, a second short 
handwritten notation stated, "the defendant on or about December 15, 1998, in Salt Lake 
County, uttered, forged check at Zion's Bank, and did so with the intent to defraud (Add. C 
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at 21). The plea affidavit also stated that defendant knew and understood that "any motion 
to withdraw [his] plea[s] of guilty must be for good cause, in writing, and must be filed 
within thirty (30) days after entry of [his] guilty plea" (Add. C at 24). 
The trial court expressly incorporated the plea affidavit into the record "the same as 
if we took the time this morning to read through it on the record page by page and word by 
word" (Add. B at 6). The trial court then accepted and entered defendant's plea and set the 
matter for sentencing on May 10, 1999 (R. 26-27, 28; Add. B at 7). 
On April 27, 1999, defense counsel sent defendant a letter stating that counsel had 
been informed that morning that defendant had called and wanted to withdraw his guilty plea 
(R. 30). (The letter is reproduced in Addendum D). The letter stated that counsel was 
unaware of any grounds for moving to withdraw the plea or of defendant's reasons for 
wishing to do so (id). The letter then explained that counsel would be leaving town within 
an hour and would not be returning for a few days (id,). To preserve defendant's right to file 
a motion to withdraw his plea, counsel enclosed a pro se motion and instructed defendant to 
sign it and mail it to the court right away (id.). The letter also told defendant that counsel 
would speak to him when he returned and that if defendant had notified counsel sooner, 
counsel could have been of more assistance (id.). Counsel copied the letter to both the court, 
which received it on May 3, 1999, and to the prosecutor (id.). 
On May 10, 1999, the trial court sentenced defendant to zero to five years in prison 
and ordered him to pay restitution (R. 32-33). On May 25,1999, defendant, through counsel, 
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filed a written motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the general grounds that the plea **was 
not entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily" (R. 37). The motion, which 
acknowledged its untimeliness, was accompanied by an affidavit which stated that defendant 
never received the April 27,1999 letter from his attorney (R. 39). (The motion to withdraw 
the plea with its supporting affidavit is reproduced in Addendum E). 
The trial court held a hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea on June 18,1999 (R. ^ 
78, Motion to Withdraw Hearing at 1). Defense counsel explained why the motion was-
untimely, apparently hoping that the trial court would excuse its untimeliness and hear the -
merits of the motion (R. 78, Motion to Withdraw Hearing at 4-8). After pointing out that 
defendant had waited until the last minute to express his desire to withdraw the plea, the trial 
court denied the motion to withdraw as untimely (id. at 12-13). Defendant filed a timely 
notice of appeal from the denial of his motion (R. 60, 62). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: This Court should not consider defendant's request that it overrule its prior 
decisions holding that an untimely motion to withdraw a guilty plea is jurisdictionally barred. 
Defendant did not raise this issue below and makes this argument for the first time on appeal. 
Moreover, this Court recently rejected the same argument in State v. Ostler on the ground 
that horizontal stare decisis prohibited it from revisiting the issue. 
Point II: The trial court did not commit plain error in taking defendant's guilty plea 
because as its careful colloquy and defendant's thorough plea affidavit plainly show, the trial 
6 
court strictly complied with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in taking plea. 
Contrary to defendant's claims, the trial court properly incorporated his plea affidavit into 
the record and this Court may therefore consider it in determining whether there was strict 
rule 11 compliance. 
Point III: This Court does not have jurisdiction to consider defendant's ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim because although Ostler permits an appellate court to consider 
a plain error argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider, it does not provide 
any other avenue to reach other legal errors, including a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Even if this Court did have jurisdiction to consider this claim, defendant has not 
shown that his counsel's performance was either deficient or prejudicial because he has not 
demonstrated that he had good cause for withdrawing his plea. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S REQUEST 
TO OVERRULE PRIOR DECISIONS HOLDING THAT AN 
UNTIMELY MOTION TO WITHDRAW A GUILTY PLEA IS 
JURISDICTIONALLY BARRED BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT 
RAISE THIS ISSUE BELOW AND BECAUSE THIS COURT 
REJECTED THIS SAME ARGUMENT IN A RECENTLY PUBLISHED 
DECISION 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (1999) provides that a "plea of guilty or no contest 
may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with leave of the court." Subsection 
(2)(b) states that a "request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion and 
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shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea." (Emphasis added). However, the 
statute expressly "does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under Rule 65B, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure."1 Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(3). 
In State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 583 (Utah App. 1992), this Court held that the 
statutory deadline for moving to withdraw a plea was jurisdictional so long as the defendant 
was advised of the 30-day limitation period at the time he entered his plea. See also State 
v. Canfield, 917 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah App. 1996) ("if a defendant is advised of the deadline 
when the plea is entered, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider a motion to withdraw 
filed after the thirty-day period'9); State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1067 n.2 (Utah 1993) 
(suggesting that if defendant does not move to withdraw plea within 30 days, any available 
remedy may only be sought through post-conviction proceedings); see also Utah R. Crim. 
Pro. 11(f) (failure to advise defendant of time limit for filing motion to withdraw guilty plea 
is not ground for setting aside plea, but may be ground for extending time to make motion 
under Utah Code Ann. § 7-13-6). In other words, a trial court has no jurisdiction to consider 
whether good causes exists for withdrawing a plea if the motion is untimely. Price, 837 P.2d 
at 583; Canfield, 917 P.2d at 562. 
Although the trial court did not personally advise defendant of the 30-day limitation 
period, defendant was advised of the deadline in his affidavit (Add. B. at 24). The trial court 
*When Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 was enacted, rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, governed post-conviction proceedings. Since then, rule 65 was re-organized 
so that rule 65C is the governing rule for post-conviction proceedings. The statute does 
not reflect that revision. 
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inquired, and defendant confirmed that he had carefully reviewed the affidavit with his 
attorney (Add. B at 3). This Court recently held that advisement of the 30-day period 
through the plea affidavit was sufficient for purposes of rule 11 and Utah Code Ann. 77-13-6. 
State v. TarnawieckU 2000 UT App 186, 1fl|7-8, 397 Utah Adv. Rep. 13. Thus, under Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-13-6 and Price, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to allow defendant 
to withdraw his plea. 
Defendant nevertheless contends that both the trial court and Price incorrectly 
followed the plain language of the statute by running the 30-day limitations period from the 
date defendant entered the plea, instead of from sentencing. Amended Brief of Appellant 
[hereinafter "Amd. Br. Aplt."] at 8-12. Defendant essentially asks this Court to overrule 
Price by "look[ing] beyond the language of [Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6]" and holding that 
the 3 0-days does not begin to run until sentencing, when "the plea is entered as a final 
judgment." Amd. Br. Aplt. 12. Defendant alternatively argues that Price incorrectly held 
that the statutory 30-day limitations period was jurisdictional, and that this Court overruled 
Price two years ago in James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567 (Utah App. 1998), cert denied by 982 
P.2d 88 (Utah 1999). Br. Aplt. 12-16. 
A. Defendant has waived his arguments that Price should be overruled and that the 
30-day period runs from the date of sentencing because he did not raise those 
claims below. 
It is well-established that absent plain error or exceptional circumstances, an appellate 
court will not address an issue raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 
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1105, 1113 (Utah 1994); State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Utah 1993); State v. 
Bywater, 748 P.2d 568, 569 (Utah 1987); State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353,1357 (Utah 1986). 
Although defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea and asked the court to excuse his 
untimeliness, he never claimed, as he does now, that the statutory 30-day period should run 
from the date of sentencing rather than the date he entered his plea, and that his motion was 
therefore timely (See R. 37-39 and Motion to Withdraw Hearing). Nor did he argue that 
Price had been overruled by James v. Galetka {id.). :rr 
Defendant, therefore, may obtain review of this issue only under a plain error 
standard. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337,343 (Utah 1997); State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29,35 
(Utah), cert, denied by 493 U.S. 814, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989). Defendant, however, has not 
argued in his brief that plain error or any exceptional circumstances justify review of either 
claim. Accordingly, this Court should decline to address them. See State v. Pledger, 896 
P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (declining to review issue not raised below where appellant 
did not argue "that 'exceptional circumstances' or 'plain error' justifies a review of the 
issue"); State v. Pugmire, 898 P.2d 271,272 (Utah App.), cert, denied by 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 
1995) (declining to review unpreserved constitutional challenge to statute when appellant 
"did not even argue - let along demonstrate - plain error or exceptional circumstances"). 
In any case, plain error does not save defendant. To prevail under plain error, a 
defendant must show that 1) error exists, 2) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court, and 3) the error was harmful, i.e., that absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood 
10 
that the verdict would have been different. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
Defendant cannot show any error, obvious or otherwise, because both controlling statutory 
and case law clearly state that an untimely motion to withdraw a guilty plea is jurisdictionally 
barred and that any relief must be sought through a post-conviction petition. See Eldredge, 
713 P.2d at 36 (error would not have been "plain" or "obvious" where statutory language was 
not express and where court did not have benefit of subsequent appellate decision 
interpreting statute); andUtzh Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1999); Price, 837 P.2d at 583; Canfield, 
917 P.2d at 562. Thus, the trial court did not plainly err in denying defendant's motion to 
withdraw his plea as untimely. 
B. This Court has recently reaffirmed Price, thereby foreclosing defendant's other 
claims. 
This Court's recent decision in State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28,996 P.2d 1065, cert 
granted by Order, slip op. 20000287-SC, dated July 12,2000 (see Addendum F), disposes 
of defendant's claim that Price should be overruled The defendant in Ostler also asked this 
Court to overrule Price and hold that the statutory 30-day deadline ran from the date of 
sentencing or, alternatively, that the 30-day period was not jurisdictional. Id. at f 7. This 
Court refused, holding that it had no authority to overrule Price under the doctrine of 
horizontal stare decisis as expounded in State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,1269 (Utah 1993). 
Ostler, at ^ f 7. This Court then reaffirmed that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider the 
merits of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea filed more than 30 days after entry of the plea. 
11 
Id at H 7-8. See also Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, atlflO (reaffirming Ostler). The Utah 
Supreme Court granted certiorari review in Ostler, but not on this issue. See Add. F. 
Under Ostler, therefore, this Court may not now revisit Price. Moreover, Ostler's and 
TarnawieckVs reaffirmation of Price disposes of defendant's claim ih^i James v. Galetka, 
965 P.2d 567 (Utah App. 1998) overruled Price's holding that the 30-day deadline is 
jurisdictional.2 
In sum, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider the merits of defendant's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea and it therefore properly denied it as untimely. 
irrespective of Ostler, James clearly did not overrule Price. In James, this Court 
held that the defendant, charged with an offense on which the statute of limitations had 
run, could nevertheless plead guilty to that offense. James, 965 P.2d at 573-74. The 
Court adopted the view that "a voluntary plea of guilty by a counseled defendant operates 
as a waiver of the defense of statute of limitations which is not jurisdictional, but in the 
nature of an affirmative defense that must be timely asserted." Id. at 571 (quoting 
Conerly v. State, 607 So. 2d 1153, 1156 (Miss. 1992)). Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 is not 
a statute of limitations because it does not involve an "action" in the usual sense, nor does 
it operate for the benefit of a defendant as statutes of limitations do. See James, 965 P.2d 
at 572 (statutes of limitations protect a defendant from burden of defending against stale 
claims). Rather, the statutory 30-day limitation period is like the jurisdictional limitations 
periods found in rules 4 and 48, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Price, 837 P.2d at 
582-83. Rule 4(a) provides that a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the 
date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from and rule 48(e) requires a petition for 
a writ of certiorari to be filed within 30 days after the entry of the decision by the court of 
appeals. Utah R. App. P. 4(e), 48(a). Both rules have been held to be jurisdictional. See 
Price, 837 P.2d at 582-84. Neither rule 4 nor 48 nor section 77-13-6 operates for the 
benefit of a defendant, but for the court, by bringing finality to actions already 
commenced. Unlike a statute of limitations defense, therefore, these jurisdictional time 
limits cannot be waived by a defendant. See State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 
App. 1991) (the time for filing an appeal is jurisdictional and ordinarily cannot be 
enlarged); Earle v. Warden of Utah State Prison, 811 P.2d 180, 181 (Utah 1991) (court 
could not accept petition for writ of certiorari after time in which petition could be filed 
had expired). 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN TAKING 
DEFENDANT'S PLEA BECAUSE THE COURT STRICTLY 
COMPLIED WITH RULE 11, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE3 
Defendant relies on Ostler to argue that even though his motion to withdraw was 
untimely, this Court may nevertheless review the merits of his motion for plain error. Amd. 
Br. Aplt. 20. Defendant asserts the trial court committed plain error in taking his plea 
because it did not strictly comply with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Specifically, defendant points to the trial court's failure during the plea colloquy to orally 
address defendant's right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, the factual basis for 
the plea, or the time limit for filing a motion to withdraw the plea. Br. Aplt. at 20-21. 
Defendant is correct that under Ostler an appellate court may review the taking of a 
defendant's guilty pleas for plain error, even though the motion to withdraw the plea is 
untimely and therefore jurisdictionally barred. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, at 18. The Ostler 
court reversed a trial court's denial of an untimely motion to withdraw a plea on the ground 
that the trial court plainly erred in taking the plea without strictly complying with rule 11, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 118-26. See also TarnawieckU 2000 UT App 186, 
at HI 1-19 (applying Ostler to reverse a trial court's denial of untimely motion to withdraw 
plea because trial court did not strictly comply with rule 11). 
3This point responds to Point III, pages 20-22, of defendant's amended opening 
brief. 
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The State does not concede that Ostler was correctly decided, but maintains that if the 
trial court does not have jurisdiction to reach the merits of a motion to withdraw a plea, 
neither does an appellate court. Moreover, as stated above, the Utah Supreme Court has 
recently granted certiorari review of Ostler on that point. {See Add. F). In any event, Ostler 
is irrelevant here because both the plea colloquy and the plea affidavit clearly demonstrate 
that the trial court strictly complied with rule 11 and therefore did not commit plain error. 
A. Strict rule 11 compliance may be demonstrated on appeal by reference to the 
entire record, including a properly incorporated plea affidavit. 
Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that a trial court may not 
accept a guilty or no contest plea unless it first finds, inter alia, that 1) the plea is entered 
voluntarily, 2) the defendant knows of and understands several enumerated constitutional 
rights that he will be waiving by entering the plea, 3) the defendant understands the nature 
and elements of the offense to which he is pleading guilty, and 4) the defendant knows the 
minimum and maximum sentence. The enumerated constitutional rights which defendant 
must understand he is waiving are the presumption of innocence, the right against 
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury, the right 
to confront and cross-examine the prosecution witnesses, and the right to compel the 
attendance of defense witnesses. Utah R. Crim. Pro. 11(e)(3). 
Whether a trial court has strictly complied with rule 11 "may be demonstrated on 
appeal by reference to the record of the plea proceedings." State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 
217 (Utah 1992). The record may reflect the trial court's compliance with rule 11 by 
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''multiple means, e.g., transcript of the oral colloquy between the court and defendant, 
contents of a written affidavit that the record reflects was read, understood, and 
acknowledged by defendant and the court, contents of other documents such as the 
information, presentence reports, exhibits, etc., similarly incorporated into the record and so 
on." Id. at 218. However, 
"if an affidavit is used to aid Rule 11 compliance, it must be addressed during 
the plea hearing. The trial court must conduct an inquiry to establish that the 
defendant understands the affidavit and voluntarily signed it. . . . Any 
omissions or ambiguities in the affidavit must be clarified during the plea 
hearing, as must any uncertainties raised in the course of the plea colloquy. 
Then the affidavit itself, signed by the required parties, can be incorporated 
into the record." 
Id at 217-18 (quoting State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 477 (Utah App. 1991)). 
In other words, when a affidavit has been properly incorporated into the record, "the 
trial court need not 'perform a verbatim recitation of each and every statement in the 
defendant's affidavit."9 State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1161 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting 
State v. Trujillo-Martinez, 814 P.2d 596,599 (Utah App. 1991), cert denied by 843 P.2d 516 
(Utah 1992)). Rather, the trial court may also rely on a properly incorporated affidavit in 
complying with the requirements of rule 11. Penman, 964 P.2d at 1160-61. 
B. The trial court properly incorporated the plea affidavit into the record. 
Defendant claims that the trial court failed to directly ask him whether he had read, 
understood, and agreed with his affidavit, thereby precluding resort to the affidavit for 
determining strict rule 11 compliance. Amd. Br. Aplt. 21-22. A fair reading of the plea 
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colloquy refutes that claim. Not only did the trial court confirm that defendant had '•carefully 
reviewed" the affidavit with his counsel, but, as explained below, it also later referred to the 
affidavit in ensuring that defendant understood the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. 
After ascertaining that defendant understood the proposed plea agreement, the trial 
court asked defendant, "Now, there's a document in front of you entitled 'Statement of 
Defendant.' Mr. Hall [defense counsel] assures me that he has carefully reviewed that 
document with you earlier this morning; is that correct, sir?" Defendant responded, "Yes, 
sir" (Add. B at 3). 
Defendant claims that this exchange was not enough to ensure that he had read, 
understood, and acknowledged the contents of the affidavit for the purpose of incorporating 
it into the record. Amd. Br. Aplt. 20-21. However, by confirming that defendant had 
"carefully reviewed" the affidavit with his counsel, the trial court in fact determined that 
defendant had not only read the document, but that his counsel had explained it to him. This 
formed a basis from which the trial could conclude that defendant had read and understood 
the contents of the affidavit 
The trial court, however, did not stop there, but further inquired into defendant's 
understanding of both the contents of the affidavit and his rights. The court asked defendant 
if he understood, 
as a result of your discussions with your attorney, that by entering a guilty plea 
today you will not only be admitting that you committed the offense of forgery 
. . . and relieving the government of the burden it otherwise would have of 
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but in fact you'll be waiving, giving 
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up all of the rights that are set forth in that document, including, Mr. Sisneros, 
the right to have a trial and a trial by jury, the right to appeal to a higher court, 
even if by unanimous verdict a jury agreed upon your guilt? Do you 
understand you're giving up those rights? 
(Add. B at 4) (emphasis added). Defendant unequivocally said, "Yes" (id.). 
The trial court then reviewed more of defendant's constitutional rights, including the 
presumption of innocence, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to confront 
and cross-examine prosecution witnesses (id.). Defendant stated that he understood that he 
would also be giving up those rights by pleading guilty (id.). 
After acknowledging that defense counsel had already discussed potential penalties 
with defendant, the trial court repeated the maximum penalty defendant faced by pleading 
guilty (Add. B at 4-5). The court then asked defendant if he had "any question at all 
regarding" the conduct constituting the crime of forgery, the rights he was giving up, or the 
potential penalties (id. at 5). Defendant said, "No, sir" (id.). 
The court turned to defense counsel and confirmed that counsel believed that 
defendant was "entering his plea both willingly and voluntarily" (Add. B at 6). Addressing 
defendant again, the trial court ascertained that defendant had no difficulty understanding and 
reading English (Add. B at 6). Still addressing defendant, the court stated, "[Wjith your 
specific consent and agreement — that of [defense counsel] I'll incorporate by reference -
the plea form, the same as if we took the time this morning to read through it on the record 
page by page and word by word" (id.). Neither defendant nor his counsel objected to this 
(id.). 
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At the end of this careful plea colloquy, the trial court witnessed defendant, his 
counsel, and the prosecutor sign the plea agreement and affidavit (id at 6-7). The five 
paragraphs immediately preceding defendant's signature stated that he had not been coerced 
into pleading guilty, that he had read the affidavit and understood its provisions, that he was 
satisfied with the advice and assistance of his attorney, that he was twenty-eight years old 
and could read and understand English, that he was not under the influence of any substance 
that would impair his judgment, and that he was free of any mental illness or impairment that 
would prevent him from knowingly and voluntarily entering his plea (R. 24-25). Defense 
counsel signed a certification that defendant had in fact read or had the affidavit read to him, 
that they had discussed its contents, and that defendant fully understood its meaning (R. 25-
26). 
In sum, the trial court confirmed in a meaningful colloquy that defendant had read the 
affidavit and "carefully reviewed" it with his counsel. The trial court also addressed much 
of the information contained in the affidavit, including several of the constitutional rights 
defendant would be waiving, the potential penalties defendant faced by pleading guilty, and 
the nature of the crime he would be pleading to. That was sufficient to incorporate the plea 
affidavit into the record for purposes of determining rule 11 compliance. See, e.g., Penman, 
346 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13 (plea affidavit could properly be used in conjunction with plea 
colloquy to determine strict rule 11 compliance when trial court "engaged [defendant] in a 
meaningful plea colloquy" in which the court verified that defendant could read and 
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understand English, that defendant was not mentally ill and understood that he would be 
giving up certain constitutional rights by entering plea, that defendant understood the penalty 
for his crime, and that defendant was satisfied with his attorney's advice). 
C. The plea colloquy in conjunction with the plea affidavit strictly complied with 
rule 11. 
Between the trial court's careful colloquy and defendant's thorough plea affidavit, 
defendant was fully apprised of his rights as required by rule 11. The plea affidavit included 
every constitutional right enumerated in rule 11(e)(3) and repeated each of the rights 
discussed orally by the trial court (Add. C). The affidavit also set forth each of the elements 
of forgery and summarized the conduct by defendant that fulfilled those elements (id.). As 
stated in Point I, supra, the affidavit also explained that defendant must file any motion to 
withdraw his plea within 30 days (id.). Finally, the affidavit confirmed the trial court's 
explanation of the potential penalties defendant faced by pleading guilty (id.). 
Because the trial court strictly complied with rule 11, defendant has not shown that 
the court committed plain error in accepting his plea. 
t 
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POINT HI 
THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER 
DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM; 
EVEN IF IT DID, DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN HIS COUNSEL'S 
PERFORMANCE WAS EITHER DEFICIENT OR PREJUDICIAL 
BECAUSE HE HAS NOT ALLEGED OR SHOWN GOOD CAUSE FOR 
WITHDRAWING HIS PLEA4 
In a second attempt to obtain review of the merits of his motion to withdraw his plea, 
defendant argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed 
to timely file his motion to withdraw his plea. Amd. Br. Aplt. 16. This Court lacks 
jurisdiction to consider this claim. Even if this Court had jurisdiction, defendant has not 
established that his counsel was ineffective because he has not shown that he had good cause 
to withdraw his plea. 
A. This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider counsel's ineffectiveness claim. 
As explained, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the merits of 
defendant's untimely motion to withdraw his plea. Nor did it have jurisdiction to excuse 
defendant's untimeliness because of counsel's failures. See State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT 
App 186, If 19 n.7, 297 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (holding that although Ostler allows appellate 
court "to consider a plain error argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider, 
it does not provide any avenue to reach other legal errors," including a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel); cf. State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36,37-38 (Utah 1981) (30-day period 
for filing notice of appeal was jurisdictional and supreme court could not enlarge time to 
4This point responds to Point II, pages 16-19, of defendant's amended brief. 
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remedy counsel's failure to file timely notice; defendant's sole remedy was through post-
conviction petition). Moreover, Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 has no provision for enlarging 
the time for filing a motion to withdraw a plea, but limits any relief for failure to file a timely 
motion to post-conviction proceedings. See also State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1067 n.2 
(Utah 1993) (acknowledging that when a defendant fails to file timely motion to withdraw 
plea, section 77-13-6(3) provides that any available relief must be sought through post-
conviction proceedings); cf Utah R. Crim. Pro. 11 (f) (allowing for enlargement of time when 
defendant not advised of the 30-day limitation period); Price, 837 P.2d at 582-83 (holding 
that failure to advise defendant of 30-day limitation period is basis for extending time for 
filing a motion to withdraw a plea). As with a notice of appeal, the court's inquiry is only 
whether the motion to withdraw is timely, and not whether defendant has a good excuse for 
his untimeliness.5 See Johnson, 635 P.2d at 37-38. 
Accordingly, this Court is without jurisdiction to consider whether defendant's 
counsel performed deficiently in not filing a timely motion to withdraw the plea. Rather, 
defendant must seek review of this claim through a post-conviction petition under rule 65C, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, at ^ [19 n.7 (ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim does not confer jurisdiction on appellate court to reach merits of 
untimely motion to withdraw guilty plea). 
5In this case, the trial court actually suggested to defendant that it would consider 
his motion on the merits if defendant could show that he absolutely could not have timely 
filed his motion (Add. B at 3-5). As explained, however, the trial court was without 
jurisdiction to consider defendant's motion regardless of the reasons for his tardiness. 
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B. Defendant has not met his two-prong burden under Strickland because he has 
not alleged or shown that a timely motion to withdraw would have been granted. 
Even if this Court had jurisdiction to review defendant's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, he has not met his burden under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,104 
S.Ct. 2052 (1984). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant 
must show both that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable 
manner and that but for the identified omissions or acts of trial counsel, there was "a 
reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome." Id., 466 U.S. at 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 
at 1064, 1068; see also State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461,465 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah 
App. 1992). Defendant cannot meet this burden because he has not shown that he would 
have been allowed to withdraw his plea had his motion been timely filed. 
A guilty plea "may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with leave of the 
court." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a); accord State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44 ^  9,396 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 6; State v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 746,748 (Utah App. 1992). A '"withdrawal of a plea 
of guilty is a privilege, not a right... [and] is within the sound discretion of the trial court.'" 
Gamblin, a t l 9 (quoting State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040,1041 (Utah 1987)). Defendant's 
motion to withdraw his plea only generally alleged that his plea was not entered "knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily" (R. 37). The motion did not specify why defendant believed 
his plea to have been involuntary, but focused only on why it was untimely (R. 37-39). 
Although a trial court's failure to strictly comply with rule 11 constitutes good cause to 
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withdraw a plea as a matter of law, State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 476 (Utah App. 1991), as 
explained in Point II, supra, the trial court in this case did strictly comply with rule 11. 
Moreover, while strict compliance with rule 11 does not "foreclose the possibility 
. . . [that defendant's] plea was in fact involuntary," it does "create a presumption the plea 
was entered voluntarily." Thorup, 841 P.2d at 748; accord Gamblin, at If 11. Indeed, the 
trial judge commented at the hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw that he believed that 
defendant's plea had been entered "knowingly and voluntarily" (R. 78, Motion to Withdraw 
Plea Hearing at 4). 
Other than his mistaken claim that the trial court did not strictly comply with rule 11, 
defendant does not explain how his plea was involuntary. He has not alleged that he did not 
understand any aspect of the plea agreement or that he was somehow coerced into pleading 
guilty. The only support for his motion to withdraw is a bald, self-serving assertion that his 
plea was not knowing or voluntary. In view of the trial court's strict rule 11 compliance in 
taking the plea, that unsubstantiated assertion is not enough to show good cause for 
withdrawing his plea. 
Because defendant has not alleged or shown good cause, he has not shown that his 
counsel's failure to timely file his motion to withdraw harmed him. He has therefore failed 
to show that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the denial 
of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Statutes and Rules 
77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea. 
( D A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause 
shown and with leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by 
motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under 
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
gale 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be 
presented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
iefeadant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a 
-easonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason 
0f insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative 
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or 
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
^ ly trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving 4ach of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant 
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that 
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
Rule 11 
W the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
Inese findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
t°h f uSed ' an a f f i d a v i t raiting these factors after the court has established 
jjw the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the 
™4avit. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be 
sumcient that the affidavit has been read or translated to the defendant. 
unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
(TM? l ? t 0 ° r a d v i s e ^ ^ m i n g any collateral consequences of a plea. 
w Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
jonaraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
IQ
**e a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
©(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser inci 
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be app r o v u^ 
the court. ^ by 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the coim 
advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence ^ 
binding on the court. l % 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to anv 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. y P'«* 
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the ju<jge 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreeU^ 
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The ^ 
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whethi^ 
proposed disposition will be approved. r t^ 
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in <* 
mity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and tk 
call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. ** 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally m Z1 * 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment J* 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea * 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition 
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing vntiJ* 
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordjJ 
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. ^ 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1,1997.) 
ADDENDUM B 
Transcript of Plea Hearing 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, Case No. 991901606 SF 
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JERRY PERFECTO SISNEROS, JR., 
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APRIL 1, 1999 ENTRY OF PLEA 
BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE ROGER A. LIVINGSTON 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
652 Jefferson Cove 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
801-567-1157 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: GREGORY L. BOWN 
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
For the Defendant: JEFFREY W. HALL 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
* * * 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; THURSDAY, APRIL 1, 1999; 10:17 P.M. 
HONORABLE ROGER A. LIVINGSTON, JUDGE PRESIDING 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: And you are Jerry Sisneros; is that 
correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
MR. HALL: Your Honor, Jeff Hall on behalf of 
Mr. Sisneros. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HALL: It's anticipated that the defendant 
is going to waive his right to a preliminary hearing this 
morning and enter a guilty plea, pursuant to a negotiated 
resolution in this case, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Sisneros, you 
understand, sir, that you do have the right to a 
preliminary hearing for this Court to make an independent 
determination as to whether or not there's probable 
cause? With the advice of your counsel this morning, 
you're willing to waive and give up your right to a 
prelim; is that correct, sir? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And handling it for the State is? 
MR. BOWN: Mr. Bown, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Bown, no objection to the 
waiver? 
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MR. BOWN: That's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'll find, then, the waiver is made 
willingly and voluntarily, and order the bind-over. 
Now, did you want me to go ahead, Mr. Hall, and 
take the plea this morning? 
MR. HALL: If that's all right with Court. 
THE COURT: Sure. It's more efficient, I :; 
think, isn't it? 
MR. HALL: I agree. We've prepared a plea 
form. 
THE COURT: Mr. Bown, tell me what your plea 
negotiation is, sir. 
MR. BOWN: Your Honor, the defendant will be 
pleading guilty to a third-degree felony, forgery. The 
other counts will be dismissed. There's another check 
involved that's also involved in the reports, but there 
wasn't sufficient information to — 
THE COURT: Okay. Do you want -
MR. BOWN: - [inaudible]. 
THE COURT: — to wrap that as a check in 
restitution? 
THE COURT: That will not be filed in 
restitution. 
THE COURT: Or wrapped in restitution with the 
uncharged check? 
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MR. BOWN: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. I'll go ahead and 
approve that plea negotiation. 
Mr. Sisneros, if you go ahead and enter a 
guilty plea to Count 1, the third-degree felony, forgery, 
I will grant the motion of the State and dismiss Count 2, 
the second count the second count of forgery, as well as 
the theft by deception. But I want you to understand 
that by entering a guilty plea to Count 1 as charged, 
that you will, in fact, be admitting that you engaged in 
the conduct of and committed the offense of forgery. Do 
you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Now, there's a document in front of 
you entitled "Statement of Defendant." Mr. Hall assures 
me that he has carefully reviewed that document with you 
earlier this morning; is that correct, sir? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you understand, as a result of 
your discussions with your attorney, that by entering a 
guilty plea today you will not only be admitting that you 
committed the offense of forgery as charged in Count 1 
and relieving the government of the burden it otherwise 
would have of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
but in fact you'll be waiving, giving up all of the 
3 
rights that are set forth in that document, including, 
Mr. Sisneros, the right to have a trial and a trial by 
jury, the right to appeal to a higher court, even if by 
unanimous verdict a jury agreed upon your guilt? Do you 
understand you're giving up those rights? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Now, you're also, of course, giving 
up your presumption of innocence, your privilege against 
self-incrimination, your right to confront and 
cross-examine any witness called to testify against you. 
Do you understand that in addition to admitting that you 
committed the crime of forgery, that you're waiving, 
giving up those important constitutional rights? Do you 
understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mr. Hall has spoken to you further 
about the penalty that could be imposed. Now, I want you 
to understand that if you go ahead and enter a guilty 
plea today, that the penalty prescribed by law for a 
third-degree felony is incarceration for an indeterminate 
term not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
If you enter a guilty plea today, Mr. Sisneros, you could 
in fact be sentenced to the state prison for up to five 
years. Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
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THE COURT: Even if you're granted the 
privilege of probation, you could be ordered to serve up 
to one year in the Salt Lake County Jail as a condition 
of probation. You could also be fined — 
It's up to $5,000? 
MR. BOWN: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: - up to $5,000, together with an 
85 percent* surcharge. There is a minimum mandatory in 
the nature of restitution for these offenses, whatever 
the economic loss suffered by a bank, a vendor, a retail 
person, a person who — the owner of the checking account, 
whoever suffered any economic loss. Please understand, 
Mr. Sisneros, that in addition to whatever fine or 
penalty could be imposed, that you will, in fact, be 
ordered to pay restitution, and also for an uncharged — 
pursuant to a plea negotiation, and uncharged case 
involving another check. Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: I've spoken to you briefly about 
three areas: the conduct constituting the crime of 
forgery, the rights you're giving up, and the penalties 
provided by law. Do you have any question at all 
regarding any of those three areas? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: And, Mr. Hall, it is your informed 
judgment this morning that your client is entering his 
plea both willingly and voluntarily; is that correct? 
MR. HALL: Yes, your Honor. I concur in his 
decision to enter that plea. 
THE COURT: And, Mr. Sisneros, you don't have ~ 
any difficulty reading or understanding the English 
language, do you? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, I don't. 
THE COURT: Then with your specific consent and 
agreement - that of Mr. Hall I'll incorporate by 
reference — the plea form, the same as if we took the 
time this morning to read through it on the record page 
by page and word by word. If you'll go ahead and sign 
the document now. 
And you've signed it, Mr. Bown, have you, sir? 
MR. BOWN: I have. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Hall? 
MR. HALL: Yes, your Honor, I have. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. HALL: May I approach? 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Sisneros, to the third-degree felony 
offense of forgery as charged in Count 1 of the 
information, specifically occurring on December 14th or 
December 17th of last year, 1998, at 4643 South 
6 
40th West, how do you plead to that offense, guilty or 
not guilty? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
THE COURT: A guilty plea, then, is received 
and entered for you. 
Mr. Bown, your motion is granted. You're 
eloquent even in your silence. Counts 2 and 3 are hereby 
dismissed. 
We'll refer this matter, then, to Adult 
Probation & Parole for the preparation of a presentence 
report. Let's make a notation on that referral that 
restitution needs to include uncharged check or checks, 
and directed that amount be determined as part of the 
presentence investigative process. 
We'll set the matter for sentencing six weeks 
from today, or thereabouts? 
THE CLERK: May 10th, 1:30, Judge Peuler. 
THE COURT: Mr. Hall, that works for you, 
doesn't it? 
MR. HALL: It does indeed, your Honor. Thank 
you. 
THE COURT: Where that's 40 days, about, within 
the time provided by law. So that will work. 
MR. HALL: Thank you very much, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thanks. Okay. 
(The Court gave attention to other matters 
on the call from 10:23 a.m. until 10:25 a.m.) 
MR. HALL: Your Honor, could we visit the 
Sisneros case just briefly? There was an issue that I 
forgot to address to the Court. The defendant reminded r 
me of it. 
THE COURT: Okay. What I am addressing? 
MR. HALL: The issue is bail/ your Honor. -
THE COURT: Oh. I've lost the file, I've lost 
jurdiction. 
(Over talking) 
THE COURT: How do I deal with bail if Judge 
Peuler already has the case? 
MR. BOWN: We have no problem with this Court 
addressing it. 
THE COURT: Okay. Is there an agreement as to 
what the bail should be? 
MR. BOWN: No. 
MR. HALL: No, there's not. There's not. The 
defendant reminded me that I had neglected to address 
bail to the Court, so — 
THE COURT: Oh, okay. Well, I'll address it; I 
might not rule on it, though. Tell me what your thoughts 
are. 
MR. HALL: Your Honor, bail is set right now at 
8 
$10,000. He's pled guilty to one third-degree felony. 
The other third-degree felony's been dismissed. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. HALL: With regard to our motion to either 
an improvement or a release for the defendant or, in the 
alternative, reduce his bail. It would be our suggestion 
you reduce it by an amount to $5,000, reflecting his 
current conviction status, unless the Court [inaudible] -
THE COURT: And he has $500 so he can then go 
buy bail? Is that what you're saying? 
MR. HALL: He indicated to me that he would 
like me to move the Court to reduce the bail to at least 
$5,000. 
THE COURT: What's your position, Mr. Bown? 
MR. BOWN: Your Honor, we oppose reduction. 
The defendant — I don't have my file here because 
Mr. Jones had it and he left, and I don't know where he 
went. • 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BOWN: But as Mr. Hall and I were talking 
yesterday, we looked at the rap sheet. He has a prior 
felony conviction, and I can't remember what it was. I 
wish I had my file. 
MR. HALL: A burglary. 
MR. BOWN: A burglary in about — about eight 
9 
years - well, ninety - ninety something. 
THE DEFENDANT: '89. 
MR. BOWN: Thank you. [Inaudible] rap sheet. 
THE COURT: Let me ask this, Mr. Bown, if you 
know. Is the State going to be asking for a commitment ; 
to the Utah State Prison in his case? 
MR. BOWN: Well, frankly, we don't know. We'll 
see what - what else is out there, what AP&P recommends, 
and we have a bare-bones rap sheet. They go a little bit 
further and find out what's going on and what he's been 
doing and that sort of thing. So there's no - I don't 
know what it's going to be until I see the presentence 
report. 
MR. HALL: Your Honor, he does have — he did 
serve a prison term. He does have a few arrests on his 
record. It's not a long record, and several of the 
arrests indicated there's no information available. It's 
unfortunately typical of just — 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. HALL: — a bare-bones rap sheet. He is not 
[inaudible]. He is not currently probation, and I don't 
believe he's had an arrest within the last -
Year or two? 
MR. BOWN: It looks like the last arrest was in 
*92, but it was for a parole violation, which would 
10 
indicate to me that he's been to prison. 
THE COURT: I see. Well, you know, as a 
practical matter, I just don't like making decisions 
without information, and it seems to me, if there were 
going to be a bail reduction, I would frankly, Mr. Hall, 
want to have even, you know, pretrial take a chop. I'd 
like to know where he's going to live and that sort of 
thing, and what really the issues are. 
I'm going to deny at this time, without 
prejudice, an order reducing bail. I will say this to 
you, and I know Judge — is it Peuler you're going before? 
MR. HALL: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I know that she is not any more 
territorial than I am, and by that I mean I would not 
object hearing it; she would not object hearing it. If 
you want to get, you know, some additional information. 
And again, I don't know if that can get done how much 
more quickly than the presentence report. 
But, you know, if in a week or something, if 
pretrial could verify where he would be living, if you 
could clean up, perhaps, a little information on the 
disposition of these cases, because frankly, if he has no 
convictions since a *92 — was it? — parole— 
MR. BOWN: I don't have anything. 
THE COURT: Yeah. I mean that's different than 
11 
1 if he does. We just don't know. That's what I'm saying. 
2 And I just - you know, I don't - no matter how smart 
3 someone is, they don't make good decisions without good 
4 information, and I just don't think that it's so critical 
5 today that I release him today, reduce bail today, that —, 
6 I'd rather just really have the information. 
7 MR. HALL: I'll have pretrial take a look at 
8 it, if -
9 THE COURT: Sure. 
10 MR. HALL: - they would be so kind, and if 
11 [inaudible] — 
12 THE COURT: They could verify where he would be 
13 living and with whom and what kind of circum that 
14 means something to me. And I would also say this to you, 
15 just to think about. Since the statute was changed and 
16 it requires the six-month forfeiture, it makes the 
17 consequence a little more distant. Of course, I think if 
18 he failed to appear, he'd be virtually committing himself 
19 to prison, though, too, so there's certainly some 
20 motivation to show up. 
21 But my point is that I wonder, in lieu of a 
22 bail reduction, if it were to be changed to a cash bail, 
23 that makes some sense too. If he's going to pay $500 to 
24 a bail bondsman, for instance, maybe a pretrial release 
25 and the payment of $500 in cash, it would have more 
12 
immediate forfeiture, plus he'd have certainly the 
overwhelming likelihood of a commitment to prison 
[inaudible]. 
So I'm not necessarily opposed to that. I 
think that, for instance, a $500 cash bail and a pretrial 
release, with your clear message to him that you will 
have very little good to say in his behalf if he doesn't 
show up for sentencing, and he'd likely go to prison if 
he didn't show up — that might not be a bad resolution, 
but before I would order that, I'd want to know from 
pretrial if he's not going to be living in a drug house 
or — you know, where he's going to be and that kind of 
thing. Okay? 
MR. HALL: We appreciate this judgment, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: The other slippage on that, 
frankly, Mr. Sisneros, we have jail, but you want to get 
a good presentence report, and frankly, being available 
and being in jail is not the worst thing in getting a 
presentence report. But what I'm saying to you is if you 
do get released, make sure you don't blow off and be a 
[inaudible]. Okay? 
MR. HALL: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: The bottom line is I'm denying the 
motion, without prejudice. 
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MR. BOWN: And we would like - we would just 
ask for — I ask for specific notice about any hearings 
the bond issue. 
THE COURT: Absolutely. Thank you. It goes 
without saying, but it's good to say. Thank you, 
Mr. Bown. 
MR. BOWN: Well, it's good to say because of 
what we have to say here. 
(Proceedings concluded at 10:31 a.m.) 
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CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript 
in the before mentioned hearing held before Judge Roger 
A. Livingston was transcribed by me from a video tape 
and is a full, true, and correct transcription of the 
proceedings as set forth in the preceding pages to the 
best of my ability. 
Signed this 22nd day of July, 1999 in 
Sandy, Utah. 
Carolyn E^lckson 
Certified Shorthand Reporter 
Certified Court Transcriber 
My Commission expires May 4, 2002 
ADDENDUM C 
Plea Affidavit 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH/ 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
vAgiW V» V ^VJMtf^ 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT, 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO . °(\\<\o\uL 
COMES NOW \JPW 3* f<y ^.v. SV^oS the defendant in this 
case and hereby acknowledges and certifies the following: 
I am entering a plea of guilty to the following crime(s): 
DEGREE 
A. 
CRIME fi STATUTORY 
PROVISION 
3^ 
Id-It- Sfl 
PUNISHMENT 
Min/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory 
0~Z 
B. 
C. 
D. 
3/18/99 
-2-
I have received a copy of the Information against me, I have 
read it, and I understand the nature and elements of the offense(s) 
for which I am pleading guilty. 
The elements of the
 rcrime(s)^of which I am charged are as 
follows: 
^ ^ ^ r <s^w j^\T 
v 
My conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I. am 
criminally liable that constitutes the elements of the crime(s) 
charged, is as follows: ^ - V ^ - ^ 6LxS(L&^^
 o A <rv 
(K.jh , xA^\ V. g 11 * ~ - ^ \ , A i VfcArf^  
^ ^ ^ \ v>*-v 
il 
..311 ^ ~ 
\ -v W=*T~ A^L 
I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with 
knowledge and understanding of the following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an 
attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be 
appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I recognize that a 
condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as 
determined by the Court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so 
appointed for me. 
*% i 
-3-
2. I (hav4iwt) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have 
waived my right to counsel, I have done so knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this 
statement and understand the nature and elements of the charges, my 
rights in this case and other proceedings, and the consequences of 
my plea of guil£V. 
<*— p, 14|# If tt W ^ f not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is 
^ \ V y^Kv) \ r ^ y / axic3i * h a v e h*d *n opportunity to fully 
discuss tjhis statement, my rights, and the consequences of* my 
guilty plea with my attorney, 
5. I know that I have a right to a speedy trial in open 
court by an impartial jury and that I am giving up that right by 
pleading guilty. 
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have them 
cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have the right 
to compel my witness(s) by subpoena at State expense to testify in 
court in my behalf. I understand that I am giving up these rights 
if I plead guilty. 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf; 
but if I choose not to do so I cannot be compelled to testify or 
give evidence against myself; and no adverse inferences will be 
drawn against me if I do not testify. I understand that I am 
giving up these rights if I plead guilty. 
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me I 
need only plead "not guilty," and the matter will be set for trial. 
At the trial the State of Utah will have the burden of proving each 
element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is 
before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous. 
-4-
9. I understand the fact that as a defendant I enjoy the 
right of a presumption of innocence, I understand that I am 
presumed innocent until the State proves my guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, if this case is tried to a jury, or until I plead 
guilty. I understand that I give up the right to the presumption 
of innocence if I plead guilty. 
10. I know that under the Constitution of Utah, if I were 
tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge, I would have the 
right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of 
Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and that if I 
could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs 
would be paid by the State. I understand that I am giving up these 
rights if I plead guilty. 
11. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
offense to which I plead guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to 
an offense that carries a minimum mandatory sentence, I will be 
subjecting myself to serving a minimum mandatory sentence for that 
offense. I know that the sentence may be consecutive and may be 
for a prison term, fine, or both. I know that in addition to a 
fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. I 
also know that I may be ordered by the Court to make restitution to 
any victim(s) of my crimes, including any restitution that may be 
owed on charges that are dismissed, if any, as a result of this 
plea agreement. 
12. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, 
or the fine for an additional amount if my plea is to more than one 
charge. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or 
awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been 
convicted or to which I have pled guilty, my plea in the present 
action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
- ^ ^ 
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13. I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am 
waiving and giving up my statutory and constitutional rights set 
out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know that by entering such 
plea(s), I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the 
conduct alleged and that I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my 
plea(s) is/are entered. 
14. My plea(s) of guilty (is)(is not) the result of a plea 
bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney. The promises, 
duties, and provisions of this plea bargain, if any, are fully 
contained in this statement. 
15. I know and understand that any motion to withdraw my 
plea(s) of guilty must be for good cause, in writing, and must be 
filed within thirty (30) days after entry of my guilty plea. 
16. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a 
reduction of the charges for sentencing, made or sought by either 
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the 
Judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what 
they believe the Court may do are also not binding on the Court. 
17. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind 
has been made to induce me to plead guilty, and no promises except 
those contained in this statement, have been made to me. 
18. I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me 
by my attorney, and I understand its provisions. I know that I am 
free to change or delete anything contained in this statement. I 
do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are 
correct. 
19. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my 
attorney. 
-6-
20. I am i - \ years of age; I have attended school through 
the grade; and I can read and understand the English 
language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been 
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, 
medication, or intoxicants which would impair my judgment when the 
decision was made to enter the plea(s). I am not presently under 
the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair 
my judgment. 
21. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind; 
mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the 
consequences of my plea; and free of any mental disease, defect, or 
impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily.entering my plea. 
22. Other: 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
s/r 
I certify that I am the attorney for. 
the defendant above, and that I know he/she has ead the statement 
or that I have read it to him/her; and I have discussed it with 
him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of 
its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best 
of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the 
elements of the crime (s) and the factual synopsis of the 
- 7 -
defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along 
with the other representations and declarations made^  
defendant in the foregoing aff idavit , are accj 
>ANT/BAR # 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the 
case against , defendant. I have 
reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual 
basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the 
offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, 
or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The 
plea negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the 
attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the 
Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence 
would support the conviction of defendant for the offense (s) for 
which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance of the 
plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
/ PROSECUTING ATTORNEY/ BAR # 
ORDER 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and 
the certification of the defendant and counsel/ the Court witnesses 
the signatures and finds that the defendant's plea(s) of guilty is 
freely and voluntarily made/ and it is so ordered that the 
^vi. 
- 8 -
defendant's p l e a ( s ) of g u i l t y to the charge(s) s e t forth in the 
Statement be accepted and entered. , 
Dated t h i s ' day of_£rfll_£2> a 1999( 
1 t iered.
 n 
ADDENDUM D 
Letter from Defense Counsel 
SALT LMKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
;
. John Hill 
Director 
k>ard of Trustees 
imi Mitsunaga 
Chairman 
). Gilbert Athay 
)avid M. Bown 
tanald Coleman 
^Aaria S. Farrington 
)ennis C. Ferguson 
.ionel H. Frankel 
. Rand Hirschi 
3rant H. pMferJerry Perfecto Sisneros 
Michael J. A35sS©uth 200 East 
Metro County Jail 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
424 EAST 500 SOUTH, SUITE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
(801)532-5444 
FAX (801 )532-0330 
FAX (8011595-8213 
&tat>Lliedin 1965 
April 27, 1999 
FILED DISTRICT C008T 
Third Judicial C; ;.-ict 
r^Wlim Li&vhwfo 
D«putyCI«rfc 
Re: Third District Case No. 991901606FS 
Dear Mr. Sisneros, 
I was informed this morning that you wished to withdraw your guilty plea entered on Ap*~t I *; \c€Ci 
Unfortunately, in one hour, I am leaving town for a legal conference in San Francisco and will 
not return until Sunday. Although I am unaware of both your grounds for a motion to withdraw 
your plea, as well as your reasons for waiting until now to withdraw your plea, to preserve your 
right to do so, I am enclosing a pro se Motion to Withdraw your guilty plea. 
I am also forwarding a copy of this letter to the District Attorney's office and the Court. 
Since we have not discussed this recent development in your case strategy, I cannot advise you 
whether withdrawing your plea is a good idea. If you want to preserve your right to try, you 
should sign this Motion and mail it to the Court right away. 
I will speak to you when I return. 
Had you notified me earlier, I could have been of more assistance. 
Sincerely, 
Jeffrey Hall 
Attorney at Law 
cc: Judge Sandra Peuler 
District Attorney's Office 
enclosures 
ADDENDUM E 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 
and Supporting Affidavit 
JEFFREY W. HALL (7870) 
Attorney at Law 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE- OF 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
^*A-
^ lt> 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JERRY P. SISNEROS, 
Defendant 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA 
AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
Case No. 991901606FS 
JUDGE SANDRA PEULER 
COMES NOW the defendant, JERRY SISNEROS, by and through 
his attorney of record, JEFFREY W. HALL, and hereby moves the Court 
to withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds that the plea was not 
entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. 
This motion was not timely filed for the reasons that are 
set forth in Exhibit A (letter to defendant dated April 27, 1999), 
and the attached affidavit in support of this motion. 
DATED this day of May, 1999. 
n 
W. HALL 
for Defendant Attorney 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake 
District Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84111, this day of May, 1999. r\r -.—---. ^  y^ 
JEFFREY W. HALL (7870) 
Attorney at Law 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
: MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
JERRY P. SISNEROS, : Case No, 991901606FS 
JUDGE SANDRA PEULER 
Defendant : 
State of Utah ) 
)ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
I, Kelly N. Koeller, being first duly sworn hereby depose and 
say: 
I am employed as a legal secretary with the Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Association. On April 27, 1999, I mailed a letter and 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea to the defendant at the Salt Lake 
County Metro Jail. 
On May 18, 1999, the letter and motion were received back in 
the office, still in the envelope and marked "prisoner released." 
On May 24, 1999, I contacted Brenda at Court Services, Metro 
Jail, who informed me that Mr. Sisneros was booked into the jail on 
March 6, 1999 where he was held until transported to the prison on 
May 12, 1999 and was thus in custody on April 28, 1999, the date 
the mail was to be delivered. 
/// 
DATED this day of May, 1999 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this *ry3 day of May, 1999 
' ^ 3 f r f ^ 
Notary Public for Utah 
My Commission Expires /0~/Y -*3C£?/ 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake 
District Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City,. 
Utah, 84111, this day of May, 1999, 
DEliV; 
MA: ; v-' 
:rs I\J 
Page 2 Affidavit in Support of 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 
State v. Jerry Sisneros 
n*a* M ^ QQiQnicncirQ Mo 
ADDENDUM F 
Order Granting Certiorari Review 
in State v. Ostler 
Mi<!*NEYGtia 
JUL ' iS 208!fe SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
! i 
APPrAI.? 00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
v. 
Christopher Blain Ostler, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
FILED 
UTAH SUPREME COUR" 
J U i- ' 2 2000 
PAT BARTHOLOMEW 
CLERK OF THE COUP" 
No. 20000287-SC 
981308-CA 
985101649 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed pursuant to Rule 48, of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari filed on April 12, 2000, by petitioner is granted. 
Review will be limited to deciding whether the Court of 
Appeals had jurisdiction to decide the merits of a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea, once it concluded that the trial court 
lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits. 
Ih 74>o* 
FOR THE COURT: 
h^ard C. Howe 
Chief Justice 
